題目:Alternative Legal Institutions, Xinfang, and Finance
主講人:侯文軒 教授(英國愛丁堡大學(xué))
時(shí)間:2016年12月28日14:50-15:35
地點(diǎn):主樓241會(huì)議室
主講人介紹:
侯文軒, 愛丁堡大學(xué)金融學(xué)教授(Reader in Finance i.e. Professor without Chair),英國青年院士(愛丁堡皇家協(xié)會(huì)),亞洲金融協(xié)會(huì)董事,全英中國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會(huì)(英)董事,中國發(fā)展研究中心(英)主任,中國與全球化中心特邀高級(jí)研究員。侯文軒獲得曼徹斯特大學(xué)金融學(xué)博士,并在美國西北大學(xué)與哈佛大學(xué)研修,曾在杜倫大學(xué)擔(dān)任助理教授,副教授。
侯文軒教授還擔(dān)任European Journal Finance、Finance Research Letters、Journal of Business Ethics、Corporate Governance: An International Review、International Small Business Journal以及International Review of Financial Analysis等國際著名學(xué)術(shù)期刊的副主編或中國??骶?。
侯文軒教授致力于公司治理、制度改革和金融市場(chǎng)方面的研究,在European Journal of Operation Research、 Journal of Business Ethics 和Business History等被金融時(shí)報(bào)(FT45)和英國商學(xué)院協(xié)會(huì)(ABS-4*)列為國際頂尖的學(xué)術(shù)期刊上發(fā)表論文9篇;在Abacus、British Accounting Review、Corporate Governance: An International Review、European Journal of Finance、International Review of Financial Analysis和Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions and Money等被英國商學(xué)院協(xié)會(huì)(ABS-3*)列為國際一流的學(xué)術(shù)期刊上發(fā)表論文20篇。由Palgrave Macmillan出版社出版了《Sustainable Entrepreneurship in China》、《Developing China's Capital Market: Experiences and Challenges》、《Developments in Chinese Entrepreneurship》和《Chinese style capitalism: Current development and future implications》等專著。
侯文軒教授擔(dān)任愛丁堡大學(xué)金融管理碩士項(xiàng)目創(chuàng)始主任,獲得特許金融分析師協(xié)會(huì)(CFA Institute)認(rèn)證。侯文軒講授高級(jí)金融理論,公司治理與金融市場(chǎng)等課程,多次獲得最佳教學(xué)獎(jiǎng)和杰出貢獻(xiàn)獎(jiǎng)。人民網(wǎng),新華網(wǎng),光明網(wǎng),央視網(wǎng),千龍網(wǎng),北京晚報(bào)網(wǎng),揚(yáng)子晚報(bào)網(wǎng),齊魯晚報(bào)網(wǎng)等媒體有大量關(guān)于侯文軒教授的報(bào)道。
內(nèi)容介紹:
China’s growth miracle achieved under weak legal institutions poses a puzzle to the literature on the law-finance nexus. In this paper, we shed light on the puzzle by identifying an important alternative legal institution, known as xinfang, which is parallel to courts and administrated by the Chinese government for citizens to file cases and resolve disputes and complaints. Based on the provincial xinfang regulations, we construct an index on their regional quality and argue that strong rule of xinfang promotes financial development through protecting property rights, providing checks on government and meeting changing social needs. The results confirm our predictions in that regions with stronger xinfang system are associated with more developed equity and debt markets. The relationship is stronger in provinces with larger proportion of private economy, less corrupted government, and stronger formal legal institutions. It implies that that xinfang system benefits financial markets through protecting private property rights and complementing the formal legal system.
(承辦:科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心)