題目：Does management earning forecasts matter to private loan markets?
主講人：Jennifer Wu Tucker（University of Florida）
時(shí)間：2018年6月21日14:30
地點(diǎn)：主樓429會(huì)議室
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
Jennifer Wu Tucker先后畢業(yè)于University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ,New York University, 獲會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)碩士和博士學(xué)位。目前就職于State University of New York at Stony Brook。他有多篇成果發(fā)表于國(guó)際權(quán)威期刊The Accounting Review ，Contemporary Accounting Research, Review of Accounting Studies, Accounting, Organizations and Society和 Journal of Accounting Research。擔(dān)任多家著名期刊審搞人與編輯，并獲多種獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。
內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介：
Most prior research examines the information role of management earnings forecast (MEF) in equity markets. We investigate the confirmation role of MEF in private loan markets and hypothesize that MEF may enhance the credibility of private information communicated to lenders and therefore reduce loan spreads. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find negative associations between the occurrence, frequency, and precision of MEF and the spreads of subsequently originated loans. The economic effect is significant: among firms that provide an MEF at some point during our sample period, those issuing an MEF in the six months preceding a new loan experience a loan spread 19 basis points lower than those not issuing an MEF (about $0.88 million in annual interest savings). These associations are stronger for firms with recent restatements or in periods of greater economic uncertainty, and are weaker for firms with relationship lending. These results indicate that the effects of MEF are more pronounced when the confirmation role of MEF is in greater demand. We also find that managers increase the frequency and precision of MEF in anticipation of new loans. Overall, we provide indirect evidence of the confirmation role of MEF in private loan markets.
（主辦：會(huì)計(jì)系）
